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WHAT IS "FAIR" PARTISAN
REPRESENTATION, AND HOW CAN IT BE
CONSTITUTIONALIZED?
THE CASE FOR A RETURN TO FIXED
ELECTION DISTRICTS
JAMES A. GARDNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that states are
constitutionally required to redraw congressional and legislative districts
every ten years to equalize district populations,' the Court's decision,
which at a stroke banished malapportionment from the electoral system,
was widely hailed as a long-overdue "revolution" in American politics. 2
Four census cycles later, the process of redrawing election districts has
fallen into considerable disrepute. Complaints are heard from all
quarters that redistricting has become an exercise in unfair partisanship
in which district lines are deliberately manipulated by legislatures to
protect incumbents and to maintain or extend advantages enjoyed by
3the dominant party. The redistricting process, once viewed as a
* Joseph W. Belluck and Laura L. Aswad Professor of Civil Justice, State University of
New York, University at Buffalo Law School. This Article was originally prepared for a
conference, "Is the Wisconsin Constitution Obsolete?" at Marquette University Law School,
Oct. 5-6, 2006.
1. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2. The term "revolution" in this context is usually credited to GORDON E. BAKER, THE
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1966).
3. For just the briefest flavor of what has been a tidal wave of complaints and
commentary, see, for example, Rachel Morris, The Race to Gerrymander, WASH. MONTHLY,
Nov. 2006, at 15; Opinion, Gerrymander Blues: Practice Helps Define Political Deviancy
Down, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 2, 2006, at B-10:C; Tony Perry, Of 53 Races, Only 3
Offer Ray of Hope to Non-incumbent Party's Candidates, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, at S4.
Among more substantial reports urging reform, see CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. & COUNCIL
FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOV'T, THE SHAPE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: REPORT OF
THE REDISTRICTING REFORM CONFERENCE (2005); DOUGLAS JOHNSON ET AL.,
CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLL., RESTORING THE COMPETITIVE EDGE: CALIFORNIA'S
NEED FOR REDISTRICTING REFORM AND THE LIKELY IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 77 (2005),
available at http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/col/ric (search "Competitive Edge"); ARI
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
salutary antidote to the rise of American "rotten boroughs,"4 is now
frequently scorned as little more than an open invitation to
gerrymandering. Redistricting has been widely blamed for a precipitous
decline in the number of competitive election districts around the
nation,5 a phenomenon said in turn to undermine the responsiveness of
government to the popular will,6 thereby alienating large numbers of
voters who feel that their votes count for essentially nothing.'
WEISBARD & JEANNIE WILKINSON, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DRAWING LINES:
A PUBLIC INTEREST GUIDE TO REAL REDISTRICTING REFORM (2005), available at
http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/DRAWINGLINESFINAL_6.20.05.pdf.
4. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 15-16; J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 494-99 (1966).
5. The literature on gerrymandering is voluminous. Works specifically arguing that
redistricting practices are responsible in some degree for a decline in the competitiveness of
elections include Bruce E. Cain, Karin Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, From Equality to
Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION,
PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 21-23 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce
E. Cain eds., 2005); GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION (2002); Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went
Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179 (2003);
Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002);
David Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of
Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144 (2006). Some
scholars, however, have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad
Alexander & Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in
U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75 (2006) (finding no link between redistricting and declining
competitiveness); Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Incumbency Advantage
in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000, 1 ELECTION L.J. 315
(2002) (finding a growing incumbency advantage in races for all offices, including
gubernatorial and senatorial races, thereby undermining the conclusion that declining
competitiveness is due to gerrymandering).
To put the problem of uncompetitive elections in perspective, here is the Wisconsin
data from 2004. In the 2004 statewide elections, the presidential race in Wisconsin was highly
competitive, with the Democratic candidate receiving 49.7% of the vote and the Republican
receiving 49.3%. The Senate race was less competitive, with the race decided by a margin of
55.4% to 44.1%. However, of the eight contests for seats in the U.S. House of
Representatives, in only two races did the winner poll less that 65%; none of these races was
close as political scientists typically use the term, meaning that the winner received 55% or
less of the vote. In the sixteen state senate races in 2004, six were uncontested, five were won
by a landslide (i.e., 60% or more), and only four were decided by votes of less than 55%. All
ninety-nine state house seats were up for election. Forty-three were uncontested, twenty-
three were decided by a landslide, and only sixteen were close. Wis. State Elections Board:
Elections & Results, http://165.189.88.185/docview.asp?docid=1429&locid= (last visited Feb.
4, 2007). Overall, then, the great majority of 2004 legislative elections in Wisconsin were not
competitive. See id.
6. Compare John D. Griffin, Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A
Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis, 68 J. POL. 911 (2006) (finding that legislators are more
responsive to constituents' interests in competitive districts), with Girish J. Gulati, Revisiting
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Critics have called with increasing urgency for reform. Among the
suggestions are various substantive constitutional standards of fair
political competition;8 sophisticated measures of district compactness;9
and procedural reforms such as the use of independent districting
commissions." The U.S. Supreme Court has meanwhile affirmed on
three occasions that partisan gerrymandering can under certain
circumstances violate the Constitution, yet it has been unable to settle
on a constitutional standard for identifying when the normal political
give and take of redistricting crosses the line into unconstitutionally
unfair manipulation of representation." As Justice Kennedy observed
in his concurring opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, "there are yet no agreed
upon substantive principles of fairness in districting," and as a result,
"we have no basis on which to define clear, manageable, and politically
neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a given partisan
classification imposes on representational rights." 
12
In this Article, I wish to take up Justice Kennedy's challenge: when,
exactly, and under what circumstances, is the representation of political
the Link between Electoral Competition and Policy Extremism in the U.S. Congress, 32 AM.
POL. RES. 495 (2004) (finding no such effect).
7. E.g., Editorial, Texas Massacre, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2006, at A14 (the "certain
result" of uncontrolled gerrymandering "will be still fewer contested elections, and more
alienated voters"); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 112 (2000) (gerrymandering
"contributes to the popular perception that elections do not matter").
8. For example, the plaintiffs in LULAC argued that a districting plan could be
invalidated as a partisan gerrymander "when solely motivated by partisan objectives."
League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2006).
Grofman and King have argued for a standard of symmetrical partisan bias for evaluating the
constitutionality of districting plans. See Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of
Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6
ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007); see also Hirsch, supra note 5, at 212-13 (arguing for a standard of
partisan fairness, responsiveness, and accountability); Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of
Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (2005) (distinguishing between
offensive and defensive gerrymandering).
9. E.g., Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness
Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155 (1990); Daniel D.
Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard
Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 339-51 (1991).
10. E.g., CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. & COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOV'T, supra note
3; Issacharoff, supra note 5; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3; WEISBARD & WILKINSON, supra
note 3.
11. The Court has taken up the issue in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), and LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594. In none of these decisions did
any approach to the adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims command more than a
plurality.
12. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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parties and their supporters "fair"? Suggesting reforms to the
representational process is all very well, but what are these reforms
designed to accomplish? How should a well-functioning, fair system of
partisan representation operate? What exactly does fairness mean in
the context of legislative representation?
In fact, we do not lack for simple, well-established, appealing
conceptions of fairness in legislative representation. The problem is that
most of them are associated with non-territorial systems of proportional
representation, systems that have never found much favor in the United
States 3 and that American courts have consistently held are not
constitutionally required." The real question, then, is not how to define
fair partisan representation in general, but how to do so within a system
of representation committed to territorial districts. That is the question
I propose to address here.
The balance of the Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays out
several prominent conceptions of fair partisan representation and
explains how they are subverted by the use of territorial districts. The
reason for this subversion, I argue, is that party and territory are
conflicting and for the most part incommensurable principles upon
which to found a system of legislative representation. Part III takes the
nearly universal American commitment to territorial forms of
representation as given, and asks on what grounds, if any, it might be
justified. I conclude that a commitment to territoriality can be justified
by a normative commitment to localness and local issues as the proper
subject of state politics. Part IV then inquires how a representational
system might be structured both to honor the commitment to
territoriality on its own terms and simultaneously to satisfy other
requirements of fairness in legislative representation. I argue that the
13. For a discussion of the experiences of some of the few American jurisdictions ever to
adopt proportional representation, see KATHLEEN L. BARBER, PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION AND ELECrION REFORM IN OHIO (1995).
14. See, e.g., LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kennedy, J.) ("[T]here is no constitutional
requirement of proportional representation."); Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion)
("Our cases ...clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional
representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near
as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated
statewide vote will be."); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) ("[It is not enough
[to make out a successful claim] that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not
had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential."). Similarly, Congress in Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000), specifically disclaimed creating any
statutory right to proportional representation: "nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population."
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best solution may be to revive what was in the nineteenth century the
dominant form of legislative representation: instead of permanently
fixing the number of legislators and varying the boundaries of their
districts, as we now do, we may be better off to fix permanently the
boundaries of the legislative districts and vary the number of legislators
each district elects. Using local government units such as counties and
towns as election districts, I argue, best honors the normative
justifications for territorial districting while still permitting
considerations of fairness in both population equality and partisan
representation to be satisfied. The Article concludes with a brief
discussion of the applicability of this solution to the possibly unusual
situation of Wisconsin.
II. THE INCOMMENSURABILITY OF PARTISAN AND TERRITORIAL
FORMS OF REPRESENTATION
A. Conceptions of Fair Partisan Representation
The idea that territorial forms of legislative representation must
comport with certain standards of fairness was ushered onto the national
stage by a series of U.S. Supreme Court rulings in the early 1960s. 5 In
the most consequential of these cases, Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds
v. Sims, the Court applied a constitutional principle of one-person, one-
vote to invalidate disparities in the populations of congressional and
state legislative districts. 6 Such disparities were unfair, the Court held,
because "the fundamental principle of representative government in this
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people."' 7
The idea that legislative districts should contain equal numbers of
people is, however, much older; many state constitutions required
population equality in representation long before the Supreme Court
discovered that principle in the U.S. Constitution. The first express
constitutional requirement of interdistrict population equality appeared
15. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), later extended the one-person, one-vote doctrine to local
governments as well.
16. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1; Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533. The Court subsequently held that
congressional districts must contain precisely equal numbers of voters, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526 (1969), but that state legislative districts may deviate slightly from strict equality,
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
17. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61.
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in an 1857 amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, '8 and
numerous states soon followed suit. 9 Indeed, the very first judicial
decision, state or federal, to invalidate a districting plan on
constitutional grounds was an 1892 decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court striking down a state legislative districting plan for, among other
things, creating severe population disparities among districts in violation
of the Wisconsin Constitution.0 Even long before any state required
legislative election districts to contain equal numbers of voters, many
states constitutionally provided that the voters of each election district,
whatever its population, were entitled to elect a number of
representatives proportional to the district's population.21
In state constitutions, however, population equality was usually only
one of many requirements governing legislative apportionment, and it
frequently applied alongside other requirements with which it was in
tension, most prominently requirements that representatives be
allocated among districts of fixed territory, typically counties or towns.22
In its reapportionment decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved this
tension for federal constitutional purposes by holding squarely that
population equality trumps all other considerations, including adherence
to fixed territorial boundaries such as county lines;23 as the Court put it,
18. The provision required multi-legislator counties to be subdivided into districts
"equally, as nearly as may be, according to the relative number of legal voters in the several
districts." MASS. CONST. amends. XXI, XXII (1857). Even this requirement is predated by
the Northwest Ordinance, enacted by Congress in 1787, which provided for the creation of
territorial legislatures with members to be elected from towns and counties in proportion to
their population. Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, § 9, in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 27-28 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
19. See W. VA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4-5 (1862); LA. CONST. tit. III, arts. 10-11 (1864); MD.
CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 4 (1864); Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1865); ALA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 3
(1867); N.C. CONST. art. II, § 5 (1868); ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1870); PA. CONST. art. II, § 16
(1873); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1879); N.D. CONST. art. 2, § 29 (1889); N.Y. CONST. art. III,
§ 4 (1894).
20. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892). In a second
case decided six months later, the court struck down a revised apportionment plan on the
ground that it still contained excessive population deviations. State ex rel. Lamb v.
Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892).
21. In the eighteenth century alone, see MASS. CONST. pt. 2d, ch. I, § III, art. 11 (1780);
N.H. CONST. pt. II, House of Representatives (1784); VT. CONST. ch. II, § VII (1786); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 4 (1790); N.H. CONST. pt. II, § IX (1792); KY. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1792); VT.
CONST. ch. II, § 7 (1793); TENN. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3 (1796); KY. CONST. art. II, § 6 (1799).
22. For an overview, see James A. Gardner, Representation Without Party: Lessons from
State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (2006).
23. States are, however, permitted a small amount of wiggle room when they attempt to
adhere to local government boundaries. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)
(establishing what amounts to a presumption of constitutionality for district population
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"[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities . . . ,2" State districting authorities
subsequently interpreted this judicial mandate to require that any state
commitment to territorial election districts thereafter be implemented
through the use of geographically variable districts, detached when
necessary from fixed local government boundaries, and redrawn every
decade-or perhaps even more frequently25-to equalize inter-district
populations.
It has since become painfully clear, of course, that population
equality does not by any means exhaust public conceptions of fairness in
representation. Indeed, the federal constitutional requirement of
decennial redistricting seems, if anything, to have created regular
opportunities for just the kind of gerrymandering of which so many now
complain. This gerrymandering is perceived as unfair not because it
distributes voting influence unequally among individuals-a problem
that the one-person, one-vote doctrine successfully eradicated-but
because it is said to provide the occasion for parties and officials in
power to deliver unfair treatment to minority parties, their candidates,
and the voters who comprise their rank-and-file membership.26
Concerns about unfairness have thus shifted from the unfair treatment
of individuals to the unfair treatment of partisans.
Blame for the appearance of this kind of unfairness in representation
cannot, however, be laid at the feet of the one-person, one-vote
doctrine, for nothing in that doctrine requires an electorate to be carved
up into districts; to the contrary, the one-person, one-vote doctrine is
satisfied by definition when elections are held at large.27 The source of
the difficulty in creating a system of fair partisan representation lies,
deviations up to ten percent when created to permit adherence to local government
boundaries and for certain other reasons); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973).
24. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,562 (1964).
25. In LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2006), the Court affirmed a mid-decade
Texas redistricting that was the second redistricting plan responding to the 2000 census.
Although the Court did not directly address the merits of "re-redistricting," it suggested
strongly that nothing in the U.S. Constitution would bar the practice of multiple redistrictings
within a single census cycle. Id. at 2610.
26. Thus, the essence of a partisan gerrymandering claim has long been the denial of
equal protection to candidates, parties, and voters. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
127 (1986) (plurality opinion of White, J.) ("[T]he claim made by the appellees in this case is a
claim that the 1981 apportionment discriminates against Democrats on a statewide basis.");
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 272 (2004) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) ("The complaint
alleged ... that the legislation ... constituted a political gerrymander, in violation of ... the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
27. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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then, in our commitment on both the federal and state levels to the use
of single-member, territorial election districts." Indeed, relaxation of
this commitment would immediately make possible several appealing
versions of partisan fairness in legislative representation through the use
of mechanisms of proportional representation ("PR"). 9
Perhaps the most common, and common-sense, metric of partisan
fairness asks whether the electoral system produces a legislature in
which political parties achieve representation in proportion to their
support in the electorate. On this view, a party that is supported by
fifty-five percent of the voters should earn roughly fifty-five percent of
the legislative seats-not sixty-five or forty-five percent, results that can
sometimes be produced by clever gerrymandering." PR electoral
systems tend to produce the required proportionality much more
reliably than the prevailing American system, but they do so through
the use of multimember election districts.31 Such districts can be as large
as an entire nation, as in the case of Israel,32 but are usually considerably
smaller, typically electing between three and ten representatives per
district.33
28. Congress has, almost continuously since 1842, by statute required representatives to
be elected from single-member, territorial districts. See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER,
CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 132-35 (reprint ed. 1976) (1941). About half of the state
constitutions similarly require that members of the state legislature be elected from single-
member, territorial districts. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1;
N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
29. Good overall accounts of PR can be found in DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL
CHOICES/NEW VOICES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1993); MICHAEL DUMMETr, PRINCIPLES OF ELECTORAL REFORM
(1997); and ROBERT A. NEWLAND, COMPARATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1982).
30. For example, in the 1992 Texas congressional election, held under a plan enacted
following the 1990 census by a Democratic-controlled state legislature, Democrats and
Republicans split the statewide congressional vote almost evenly, yet Democrats won ten of
the fourteen seats (71%). AMY, supra note 29, at 44. Of course, not every attempted
gerrymander is successful. Grofman and Brunell recently coined the term "dummymander"
to describe what happens when the party in control of redistricting overreaches. See Bernard
Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, The Art of the Dummymander: The Impact of Recent
Redistricting on the Partisan Makeup of Southern House Seats, in REDISTRICTING IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 183 (Peter F. Galderisi ed. 2005).
31. AMY, supra note 29, at 14.
32. See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 218 (1984).
33. See, e.g., ROBERT A. NEWLAND, COMPARATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 86 (1982)
(listing district sizes in nations that use the single transferable vote form of PR). Evidence
suggests that the marginal increase in the proportionality of representation declines rapidly as
the number of representatives to be elected from each district increases. DOUGLAS W. RAE,
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS ch. 7 (1967).
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Another somewhat more sophisticated conception of fair legislative
representation favored by political scientists requires a correspondence
between the policy preferences of the median legislator and those of the
median voter.3 This conception, rooted in economic theories of
democracy, holds that the purpose of a well-functioning electoral system
is to produce a legislature committed to implementing the wishes of the
people. The wishes of the people, in this model, are generally
represented by the preferences of the median voter, a hypothetical
person whose political opinions lie at the precise center of public
opinion. 3' Governments, in turn, are more likely to respond to and
implement the wishes of the median voter when the distribution of
political opinion in the legislature matches its distribution in the
electorate, and specifically when the positions of the median legislator-
that legislator whose positions lie at the center of opinion among all
legislators-correspond to those of the median voter.3 This theory
generates a robust and highly specific conception of what, precisely, is
wrong with gerrymandering: it skews the distribution of opinion in the
legislature in the direction of the party responsible for the gerrymander,
thereby making the legislature less likely to respond to genuine public
opinion, a practice that is not only unfair on this model to other parties
and their supporters but also diminishes overall social welfare. Recent
studies confirm what intuition suggests: PR is much more successful
than the American system of single-member, territorial districts at
producing a legislature with the optimal policy preference profile.37
In fact, PR is more successful at producing representation that is fair
or otherwise proper, regardless of how these concepts are defined,
under any aggregative theory of democracy. Contemporary theories of
democracy may usefully be divided roughly into two camps: the
aggregative and the deliberative. "[A]ggregative theorists," according
to one prominent scholar, "regard [voter] preferences as given and
concern themselves with how best to tot them up. . . .Deliberative
theorists, by contrast, . . . tak[e] a transformative view of human
34. The classic statement of the median voter theory appears in ANTHONY DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). For a recent, clear, and very accessible
account of the theory, see REBECCA B. MORTON, ANALYZING ELECTIONS 91-95 (2006).
35. MORTON, supra note 34, at 94.
36. Or is at least part of the governing coalition. See MICHAEL D. MCDONALD & IAN
BUDGE, ELECTIONS, PARTIES, DEMOCRACY: CONFERRING THE MEDIAN MANDATE
(2005).
37. Id.; G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY:
MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000).
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beings... [and] concern themselves with the ways in which deliberation
can be used to alter preferences so as to facilitate the search for a
common good."' The reason why aggregative theories of democracy
consistently favor PR over single-member districting is because such
theories by definition treat the entire electorate-not merely a majority
of the electorate-as the point of reference both for calculating the
content of the popular will and for evaluating the responsiveness of
government to that will. Aggregative theories, that is, aggregate the
preferences of all citizens, not just citizens who support those in power
or who, under the rules of the electoral system, happen to vote
successfully for a winning candidate. 39 Applied to an American state,
such theories rest on a conception of the voters of the state as
individuals, not as members of any particular group or party, and thus
arrive at their evaluations of democratic responsiveness by aggregating
the preferences of all eligible voters statewide.
Territory, then, by definition, plays no role whatsoever in
constituting a fair system of aggregative democratic representation, and
according to such theories PR is therefore far superior to single-member
districting at producing the desired aggregations because it treats all
members of the electorate as equivalent, regardless of their partisan
affiliation or place of residence. Subdividing an electorate into
territorial groupings may be tolerated in such systems, but only as an
administrative necessity," and is perceived to have no meaningful
implications of any kind for the status or treatment of voters,
candidates, or parties.
Attractive and simple as these conceptions of partisan fairness may
be, however, they have not been constitutionalized in the United States.
No one, including American courts that have considered the question,
seems to suggest that proportional systems of representation are not
fair; courts simply maintain that this particular brand of fairness is not
38. IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3 (2003). Michelman refers
to aggregative theories as "responsive," and usefully analogizes public opinion in these
theories to vector inputs: "The agency of each is diluted but preserved in a stream of political
results that 'respond' like vector sums to each and every input vector." Frank I. Michelman,
Must Constitutional Democracy Be "Responsive"?, 107 ETHICS 706, 708 (1997).
39. That is why William Riker famously dismissed such theories. WILLIAM H. RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).
40. That is, to prevent voters from having to select candidates for every seat in the
legislature. The use of multimember districts then reduces the number of candidates to be
elected to a manageable number. See BARBER, supra note 13.
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constitutionally required." Proportional representation could, of
course, be constitutionalized at the state level; nothing in the federal
constitution bars a state or locality from replacing its system of
territorial districting with PR, and indeed some American localities
adopted PR systems early in the twentieth century before eventually
abandoning them.42 But the prospects of such a reform today seem
exceedingly dim.
B. The Unsuccessful Attempt to Apply Measures of Partisan Fairness to
Territorial Districts
It is, then, our national commitment to territorial districting that
complicates any attempt to achieve legislative representation
comporting with the kinds of partisan fairness described above, those
associated with aggregative theories of democracy. Territoriality does
not by itself guarantee partisan unfairness in legislative representation,
but it does create the conditions under which fairness can, on these
definitions, be undermined.
The most common situation in which territoriality undermines the
proportionality of partisan representation in the legislature is the
familiar one in which partisans are distributed unevenly across the
electorate-as they almost inevitably are. In our time, the most
prominent example of this phenomenon is probably the tendency
toward geographical clumping of Democrats in cities and Republicans in
rural and suburban areas." Territoriality can also undermine the
influence of the median voter on the composition of the legislature, and
thus legislative responsiveness and utility maximization, when a
legislative majority can be consistently assembled that departs from the
median, especially when the legislator whose positions correspond to
41. See supra note 14.
42. See BARBER, supra note 13. Few cases have adjudicated the constitutionality of PR;
one reason for the paucity of cases is certainly that the use of PR in the United States has
been so rare. In a small burst of cases decided during the 1920s and '30s, the highest courts of
New York and Ohio upheld PR against challenges grounded in their state constitutions. E.g.,
Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1937); Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 141
N.E. 27 (Ohio 1923). Courts in California and Michigan struck down PR as not then
permitted under extant state constitutional provisions, People ex rel. Devine v. Elkus, 211 P.
34 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922); Wattles v. Upjohn, 179 N.W. 335 (Mich. 1920), but obviously
nothing in these cases would bar an amendment to the state constitution to permit PR.
43. The actual distribution is of course somewhat more complicated than the basic rule
of thumb would indicate. For a sophisticated analysis, see, for example, Stephen
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Reapportionment and Party Realignment in the
American States, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 433 (2004).
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those of the median voter is not a member of the majority party or
coalition of parties." Territorial districting makes this more likely
because, again, voters of particular viewpoints are more likely to cluster
unevenly than they are either to be distributed uniformly across the
jurisdiction or to be completely segregated geographically by residence.
This unevenness can be exploited by districting authorities to create a
legislature that overrepresents certain points of view, thereby skewing
legislative opinion as compared to popular opinion.45
What we need, then, is a definition of partisan fairness that takes
into account both the commitment to partisan proportionality in
legislative representation and the commitment to territorial election
districts. Attempts to construct such a definition have, however, been
generally unsatisfying.
Proportional representation rests its claim to partisan fairness on a
concept of equality of outcome: what makes proportionality fair is the
fact that a party's representation in the legislature is equal to its support
in the electorate, as demonstrated through actual voting by its
supporters; inputs, that is, are translated faithfully by PR systems into
outputs. Equality of outcome is of course a robust and highly appealing
conception of fairness,46 but for the reasons already mentioned, it is a
type of fairness the achievement of which is severely impeded by the use
of territorial election districts. In territorial systems, inputs-electoral
support in terms of votes cast-simply do not translate well into partisan
legislative representation because voters' partisanship and their
geographical location rarely match up sufficiently closely to mimic the
operation of a non-territorial proportional system.47
As a result, evaluations of the fairness of territorial districting
arrangements have tended to focus not on equality of outcome, but on
44. MCDONALD & BUDGE, supra note 36, at 229-30.
45. A good discussion of this kind of policy distortion appears in Thomas W. Gilligan &
John G. Matsusaka, Public Choice Principles of Redistricting, 129 PUB. CHOICE 381 (2006).
However, it must be noted that this analysis presupposes, perhaps unrealistically, no minority
influence or bargaining leverage at either the electoral or legislative phases.
46. See, for example, Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A
Philosophical and Constitutional Appraisal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 855-57 (1985), who argues
that equality of opportunity is most often a second-best concept compared to equality of
results, and to which resort is justified only under conditions of scarcity. Rae makes a similar
point in DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 85-86, 105-06 (1981) (arguing that identity of
lots is sufficient but not necessary for "lot-regarding equality," and suggesting "absolute
equality" is typically available only under restrictive circumstances).
47. See, e.g., AMY, supra note 29, at 50-51 (describing how geographic concentrations of
partisans can result in gerrymandering, even unintentionally).
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equality of opportunity. On this view, the problem with gerrymandering
(and by implication with territorial districting) is said to be its capacity
to stack the deck, to deprive the party out of power not of legislative
seats to which it is in some sense "entitled," but of a fair opportunity to
compete successfully with the party in power for those seats. 48 In a
gerrymandered district, in other words, which party will capture the seat
is foreordained; even worse, because the party that will control
individual seats is foreordained, the party that will control the
legislature also may in many cases be determined before a single vote is
cast. It is this aspect of predestiny, then, and the futility of resistance
through any of the means typically available to parties-campaigning,
fundraising, voter mobilization efforts, and so on-that makes
gerrymandering unfair on this view. Consequently, most attempts to
define partisan fairness in a system of territorial districts focus on the
degree to which parties have a realistic chance to compete for individual
legislative seats, and ultimately to compete on equal terms for control of
the legislature and the power to make public policy that such control
confers.
This seems like a promising definition of partisan fairness, but it is in
fact fatally flawed, for two reasons. First, the definition is conceptually
incoherent because it is almost never genuinely possible, except in a
very abstract and thus largely irrelevant sense, for parties to be able to
compete equally for votes in any given jurisdiction. Second, even where
such competition might in principle be possible, it would in most cases
be normatively undesirable.
In a territorial electoral system, political parties compete for control
of the legislature by appealing to voters in the various districts. In
economic theories of democracy, any party can in principle win any
district, regardless of the political opinions of the district's voters, simply
by tailoring its positions to appeal to such voters as the district actually
happens to contain. 49 In the real world, however, parties seem to be
unable to tailor their positions with the necessary sensitivity, or are at
least unable to do so in the relatively short period between redistricting
48. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2004) (both arguing that
anticompetitive political structures, particularly incumbent self-entrenchment, are the main
evils to be avoided in electoral regulation).
49. DOWNS, supra note 34, at 28-31, 97-98, 100-03.
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cycles,' and consequently tend to compete in all districts, season after
season, on similar grounds consisting mainly of their central, long-
standing policy commitments." As a result, it is never the case that any
party, regardless of its ideological commitments, candidates, resources,
and other characteristics, will have an "equal" chance to compete for
votes in any given district. In the real world, the opportunity to compete
successfully for legislative seats simply is not equally distributed. The
Communists and the Nazis do not have an "equal" or "fair" chance of
electoral success because no one will talk to them, much less vote for
them. Their chances are equal only in the most abstract and formal
sense that they are as free as anyone else to approach and attempt to
persuade any voter, to solicit signatures for ballot access, and to raise
campaign funds-all of which will be of no avail in any legislative district
in the United States. The same is true of Republicans and Democrats: a
Democratic candidate does not have an "equal" chance to compete
successfully for votes in an overwhelmingly Republican district because
what makes the district an identifiably Republican one is precisely the
degree to which the district's voters predictably will support candidates
who run as Republicans. Critics of gerrymandering consequently must,
and do, reject the idea that equality of political opportunity is satisfied
when each party has nothing more than the equally futile opportunity to
compete for seats in districts stacked against it.52
It follows that if each party is to have a genuinely meaningful
opportunity to compete for a particular seat, reliable partisans must be
distributed roughly equally within the district. Since many voters are
50. That they can do it sometimes is shown by their ability to do it in jurisdictions that
do not change boundaries. For example, the Republicans held the governorship of
Massachusetts from 1991 to 2006 (Weld, Celucci, Swift, Romney) and New York from 1994 to
2006 (Pataki), both Democratic strongholds, and have held the mayoralty of New York City,
an overwhelmingly Democratic jurisdiction, since 1994 (Giuliani, Bloomberg).
51. This is certainly a central assumption of the responsible party model. AUSTIN
RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT: ITS ORIGINS AND
PRESENT STATE (1954); see also MALCOLM E. JEWELL & DAVID M. OLSON, AMERICAN
STATE POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS (1978) (documenting the ways in which national
political and party trends create convergence in the positions and commitments of state
political parties).
52. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. & COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOV'T, supra
note 3, at 12 (arguing against the desirability of a "sweetheart gerrymander ... that is equally
fair to each major party by giving each as many safe seats as possible"). Interestingly,
proponents of the partisan bias standard for evaluating districting plans do not share this
squeamishness; in their view, the only thing that counts is equal treatment of the parties,
including equal futility. See Grofman & King, supra note 8.
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independent or unaffiliated with a major party, 3 this will in most cases
mean that a territorial election district offers each major party a
meaningfully equal opportunity to compete for the seat only when the
district contains roughly equal numbers of reliable Democrats and
reliable Republicans and the balance of power in the district is held by
voters who are independent, unaffiliated, or unreliable; in other words,
swing voters-voters who might in the right circumstances support
either party. 4 That this is the dominant conception of partisan fairness
is reflected not only in the frequency with which charges of
gerrymandering rest upon complaints about the unequal distribution of
reliable partisans-"packing" and "cracking," for example 55-but also in
the recent stress on the "competitiveness" of districts as a criterion of
partisan fairness.56
Yet this conception of equality of political opportunity suffers from
several serious flaws. First and most obviously, it will rarely be possible
to design a redistricting plan in which every district contains equal
numbers of Democrats and Republicans simply because the voters of a
state do not ordinarily sort themselves conveniently into equal numbers
of supporters of each party.57 Where partisans are not evenly balanced,
53. In 2000, forty percent of voters identified themselves as independent. HAROLD W.
STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, 2001-2002, at
114 tbl.3-1 (2001).
54. Wattenberg, for example, describes such voters as being "neutral toward both
parties," a phenomenon the growth of which he calls "dealignment." MARTIN P.
WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
OF THE 1980s, at 42, 31-46 (1991); see also PHILIP D. DALTON, SWING VOTERS:
UNDERSTANDING LATE-DECIDERS IN LATE-MODERNITY 8 (2006) (describing swing voters
as "politically nonhabitual, neither partisans nor nonvoters"). According to Campbell, "late
deciding voters . . . are likely to divide [among the parties] fairly evenly." JAMES E.
CAMPBELL, THE AMERICAN CAMPAIGN: U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS AND THE
NATIONAL VOTE 47 (2000).
55. "Packing" refers to stuffing a district as full as possible of the other party's
supporters and conceding the district, thereby taking opposing voters out of other districts in
which their votes might be more effectively used. "Cracking" refers to dispersing the
opposing party's supporters so that they are in the minority in a large number of districts
rather than in the majority in a smaller number of districts. In both cases, votes by the
opposition are "wasted," in the first case by concentrating them into an unnecessary
supermajority, and in the latter by diluting them into ineffective minorities.
56. For example, in 2000 the Arizona Constitution was amended by initiative to require
expressly that election districts be drawn so as to be competitive. ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, §
1(14)(F) ("To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored.").
57. In a 2005 Harris Poll, approximately one-third of voters surveyed nationally
identified themselves as Republicans and another one-third identified themselves as
Democrats. Harris Interactive, Harris Poll #19, Party Affiliation and Political Philosophy
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districting authorities can make every district competitive only until the
point at which they run out of reliable partisans of one stripe or the
other, meaning that at least some, and possibly a considerable number
of districts within the state must simply be awarded, without the
opportunity for meaningful competition, to the party with the more
numerous supporters.58 Moreover, the underlying conception of equal
opportunity to compete offers no resources to determine how many
districts within a state may be rendered uncompetitive before the
districting plan becomes "unfair" on the ground that it offers insufficient
opportunities for meaningful partisan competition.59
Second, even if it were possible, due to a fortuitously precise balance
of Democrats and Republicans within a state, to make every district
competitive by filling it with equal numbers of major party supporters
and topping it off with a layer of swing voters to hold the balance of
power, each party still would not have a truly equal chance to compete
for control of each district and of the legislature. In theory, perhaps, all
parties have an equal chance to compete for the support of swing voters.
In the real world, however, no party ever has precisely the same chance
as every other party to compete for the support of swing voters because
swing voters swing for many different reasons-the state of the domestic
economy, foreign policy challenges, the price of gasoline, the personal
characteristics of the candidates available to each party, and so on-and
Show Little Change, According to National Harris Poll (Mar. 9, 2005),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=548 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
58. A requirement to draw competitive districts is evidently very difficult to satisfy. In
Arizona, a 2000 state constitutional amendment affirmatively requiring districting plans to be
competitive where possible, ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F), has had little effect in
producing competitive districts. In the 2004 congressional elections, for example, the closest
of Arizona's eight congressional races was decided by a margin of more than twenty
percentage points. Two congressional districts so favored the Republicans that the
Democrats did not even bother to field a candidate. Sixteen out of thirty state senate seats
were uncontested by one party or the other, and no candidate in a contested race won by
fewer than ten percentage points; most contested seats were decided in landslides. Arizona
Secretary of State: 2004 General Election Results, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/
General/2004_General-results-query.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
59. There is some evidence to suggest that public conceptions of sufficiently widespread
competition require a fairly large proportion of genuinely competitive districts. For example,
in a recent editorial criticizing the Electoral College for suppressing competition in
presidential elections, the New York Times complained that "[in 1960, 24 states, with 327
electoral votes, were battleground states.... In 2004, only 13 states, with 159 electoral votes,
were." Editorial, Drop Out of the College, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A26. This suggests
that elections will not be considered adequately competitive unless there are close races in
substantially more than one-fourth of all jurisdictions, a result that can be difficult to obtain in
jurisdictions that tilt strongly toward a particular party.
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some of these considerations tend to favor candidates from one party or
the other. As a result, the ability of parties to compete for actual swing
voters in any actual district is contingent on many variables, including
the specific mix of characteristics of the swing voters found in that
district, which may differ from the mix of characteristics of swing voters
in other districts.
Moreover, many of the factors that might influence the parties'
relative abilities to compete for swing votes in a district are neither
foreseeable nor susceptible to control by either the parties or the
officials who draw district lines. If the U.S. is suddenly threatened
militarily from abroad, for example, Democrats will probably not
compete among swing voters as well as Republicans, and vice versa in
the event of an unexpected domestic environmental disaster. Because
we can never know in advance how political conditions will develop and
thus what will be necessary to appeal successfully to a district's swing
voters, it is impossible to construct a district in which each party has, ex
ante, a truly equal chance to win the district.60
Such an arrangement might nevertheless be deemed "fair" in the
sense that the issues capable of moving swing voters are both
unpredictable and outside the control of the parties, and in
consequence, the chance that any particular party will be the beneficiary
of unforeseen developments during the period immediately preceding
the election is essentially random. Yet it is by no means clear that an
electoral system in which control of the legislature is driven almost
entirely by the short-term responses of swing voters to randomly
occurring events outside the control of political actors is a normatively
desirable one. Surely it is better to construct a system of legislative
representation that responds to the well-considered, long-term wishes of
the great mass of the citizenry than one that responds mainly to short-
term lurches in the opinions of a comparatively small slice of the
electorate. Indeed, a system of representation in which control of
legislative seats is systematically determined by swing voters is one that
vests decisive power to determine the composition of the legislature
almost entirely in the hands of a group of voters notorious for their
ignorance of, inattentiveness to, and emotional and intellectual
detachment from all things political.6' Such a system is not well
60. As Campbell notes, "Unsystematic aspects or unique events of particular campaigns
may be decisive in close elections." CAMPBELL, supra note 54, at 182.
61. MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTr KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 172-73 (1996); PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, BERNARD
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calculated to produce either good governance or meaningful democratic
accountability based on actual governmental performance, often said to
be important conditions of democratic legitimacy.62
Finally, as many have pointed out, a districting plan in which every
district is evenly balanced by party and thus genuinely competitive runs
the risk of producing a normatively undesirable result: massive swings in
the partisan composition of the legislature in response to small
63fluctuations in public opinion. If every district is split evenly among
Republicans and Democrats, then even a slight general shift in voter
preferences toward one party can permit that party to win every seat,
even if it is supported by only fractionally more than half the electorate.
This is not, however, an objection based on a lack of equal opportunity
to compete but one based on a lack of equality of outcome; it says that
an electoral system can be too competitive for its own good, and that
there are consequently limits to how far an electoral system should
pursue a conception of equal opportunity to compete. Once again,
though, the source of this conflict lies not in the underlying conceptions
of fairness but in a commitment to territorial districting. Non-territorial
systems of proportional representation provide parties with an "equal"
opportunity to compete 6' and equality of outcome in converting votes to
seats. It is the commitment to single-member territorial districts that
pits these otherwise commensurable conceptions of equality against one
another.
C. The Conflict Between Territoriality and Partisan Fairness
I have suggested thus far that recent attempts to apply measures of
partisan fairness to single-member territorial districts are badly flawed.
Yet this should not be surprising: the reason why it has proven difficult
to come up with a workable definition of electoral fairness that
accommodates both partisan competition and territorial districting is
BERELSON & HAZEL GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER MAKES UP His
MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN chs. 6-10 (3d ed. 1968); Philip E. Converse,
Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes, 26 PUB. OPINION Q. 578 (1962).
62. This is the key assumption of the responsible party model, see, e.g., American
Political Science Association, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the
Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. (SUPPLEMENT) 15-24 (1950);
RANNEY, supra note 51, and models of retrospective voting, see MORRIS P. FIORINA,
RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981).
63. E.g., Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser & Patrick Egan, The Complicated Impact of
One Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299,
1321 (2002) (describing tradeoff between competitiveness and representativeness).
64. Equal, that is, given the actual policy preferences of the electorate.
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that they are conflicting and indeed incommensurable principles upon
which to base a system of legislative representation. Party and territory
are completely different mechanisms for constructing a democratically
representative legislature. In its simplest terms, the difference amounts
to this: to represent voters by territory is to organize the electorate
according to bonds of local community and interest; to represent voters
by party, in contrast, is to represent them according to bonds and
interests that are found statewide, and that by definition transcend the
boundaries of any single district.
Political parties represent groups of people who share politically
salient interests and policy preferences.65 Yet parties, especially in a
two-party system such as ours, do not ordinarily represent interests that
are organized territorially. Indeed, on those rare occasions when parties
do represent interests organized territorially-as in a politics of
sectionalism-such an arrangement is viewed as a pathology of party
politics and, especially in light of the United States election of 1860, a
harbinger of serious social and political problems.6
According to prevailing contemporary models of party politics,
political parties in a two-party system compete for the allegiance of
voters. This competition in turn allows the electorate to exercise some
degree of indirect control over the substance of government policy by
turning out of office a party that has not performed up to public
expectations. 6' However, when only two parties contest for power
within a state, the coalitions embraced by each party's organization are
necessarily broad-in fact, by definition, statewide. Party competition is
aimed, after all, at political control of the entire state, not merely of
individual localities, and achieving that goal requires that a party gain
the adherence of very large segments of the state polity. Control of the
65. See, for example, the many cases treating parties as expressive associations entitled
to First Amendment protections, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208
(1986), Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989), and
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
66. In the election of 1860, Lincoln, the Republican candidate, was elected president
without earning a single electoral vote from any southern state, which went overwhelmingly
for the Southern Democratic candidate, John Breckinridge. This result is widely viewed as
one of the precipitating events leading up to the Civil War. For an account, see, among many
possible sources, DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 405-47 (1963).
67. This view, usually associated with JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950), later evolved into the so-called "responsible
party model." See RANNEY, supra note 51, at 10-14 (describing how a two-party system
ensures governmental responsiveness); American Political Science Association, supra note
62, at 15-19 (criticizing parties as not fulfilling their responsibilities to two-party democracy).
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apparatus of state government, moreover, is useful mainly for
implementing policies of uniform statewide applicability.6
Representation based on party is thus a way of creating and exploiting
the power of coalitions that cross district lines; it is a method of gaining
control over many districts at once by appealing to cleavages that cut
across most or all election districts throughout the state. It follows that
a party-based system of representation is most appropriate where, to
achieve their goals, voters need to form alliances and coalitions on a
broad scale, a scale that transcends local district boundaries. In this
sense, a two-party system is a top-down system of political organization:
it begins with competition for the allegiance of a majority of the
statewide electorate; advances toward that goal when parties
differentiate themselves along cleavages that divide huge coalitions of
voters that cut across local and district boundaries; and ends with the
election of a party committed to implementing statewide policies that
correspond to the positions it took to differentiate itself from competing
parties.69
Territorial representation is, by contrast, more of a bottom-up
method of representation; it presupposes that the interests that ought to
be represented in the legislature are those that are held in common by
people living in a particular place. But interests that people have in
common only in virtue of where they live are not especially likely to be
shared by people living in other places, and there is consequently no
particular reason to think that the voters of one district would derive
any great benefit from forming alliances with voters in more than at
most a small number of neighboring districts to advance their objectives
in the legislature. In short, if the issues of interest to a district's voters
are truly local, and thus neither require nor invite alliance with anyone
outside the district (or perhaps at most require alliance with residents of
immediately neighboring districts), then party is essentially useless as a
vehicle for advancing voters' interests.
68. Many state constitutions expressly forbid special legislation, a form of legislation of
limited applicability that affects only specific locations or individuals within the state, thereby
forcing state legislatures to deal with problems using only general legislation, by definition of
statewide applicability. For an overview, see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 802-23 (3d ed. 1999).
69. It is no coincidence that the two-party system is often thought of as an elite-driven
system. Schumpeter, one of its early and most influential theorists, claimed after all that "the
electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede." SCHUMPETER, supra note 67, at
283.
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Indeed, using partisanship as a vehicle for representation may
actually impede the satisfaction of local, territorially-defined interests.
If the introduction of a statewide party system means anything, it means
that legislators are no longer exclusively delegates of the district
communities that elect them. Because they are members of statewide
political parties, representatives are no longer responsive only to the
voters in their districts, but are linked through party membership to
representatives of the same party from districts across the state.70 In
pursuing, as they must, goals established at least in part by their parties,
representatives will necessarily pursue policies that are of broad-based
benefit to large segments of their parties' constituent coalitions. Party
thus intermediates between the representative and represented
interests, necessarily undermining to at least some degree the congruity
between the community of interest captured in a representative's district
and the community of interest of party policy beneficiaries. That is to
say, party membership operates, and is designed to operate, to place
pressure on each representative to act in ways that will not benefit solely
the people of his or her home district; the menu of items on the party's
agenda will benefit people in all parts of the state. This is, of course,
precisely the benefit that party as a mode of political organization is
meant to confer; on the assumptions underwriting the two-party system,
party organization is seen as a way of pursuing the common good of the
entire polity more effectively and efficiently." Even so, such a system is
very different from one of direct representation of local interests, where
the benefits of policies sought by representatives are meant to accrue to
the inhabitants of the district, and nowhere else (or at least nowhere else
of interest to district residents).
70. Indeed, since state parties are almost never distinct from national parties,
representatives are typically linked into a national party coalition that further influences and
constrains the content of their positions, further eroding representatives' direct accountability
to district citizenries.
71. Or at least the good of the majority, which in contemporary theories of party
government is typically equated with the good of all: "party government is a proposal for
implementing majority-rule, no matter what the majority may decide to do with its power.
Any decision made in accord with the majority's wishes is, by definition, a 'democratic'
decision." RANNEY, supra note 51, at 11. Cf American Political Science Association, supra
note 62, at 15 ("The party system ... serves as the main device for bringing into continuing
relationship those ideas about liberty, majority rule and leadership which Americans are
largely taking for granted.").
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III. JUSTIFYING TERRITORIAL MODES OF REPRESENTATION
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the reason why we have
been unable to identify redistricting practices that consistently produce
fair representation of political parties and their supporters in the
legislature is not, as Justice Kennedy suggested in Vieth, that we have
yet to "agree[] upon substantive principles of fairness in districting."
Such principles exist, and are uncontroversial. The real reason is that
our ability to achieve fair partisan representation is consistently
thwarted by our commitment to territorial representation. But if
territorial representation is the problem, why are we so strongly
committed to it, especially when it frustrates the achievement of fairness
in partisan representation, a goal of great importance? Is territoriality
merely a piece of historical baggage? What kind of representation does
territoriality aim to achieve? How, in other words, can it be justified?
Despite its critical importance in structuring the American political
system, how to justify the single-member territorial election district is a
question that has received startlingly little attention.73 To the extent this
question has been addressed at all, the most commonly given answers
seem to be that single-member territorial districts facilitate the effective
delivery of constituent service, and that they make it easier for
candidates to communicate with and campaign among voters.74 In the
modern world, however, these are at best makeweight justifications.
Assistance in obtaining government services would be no more difficult
for voters to request or for representatives to provide if voters were
sorted into districts alphabetically instead of geographically. And in an
age when face-to-face campaigning is essentially dead, complaints about
72. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004).
73. Among the very few theoretical works to address the question directly are NANCY L.
SCHWARTZ, THE BLUE GUITAR: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND COMMUNITY (1988),
which favors them, and ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2005), which
argues against them.
74. These justifications are sometimes found in cases dealing with district compactness
and contiguity requirements. See, e.g., Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D.
Wis. 1992); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992); Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 109
(Va. 2002); In re Reapportionment of Hartland, Windsor & West Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 330
(Vt. 1993); see also Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 985 (R.I. 1984) (stating that the purpose
of the compactness requirement is "'to provide an electorate with effective representation"')
(quoting Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d 799, 802 (R.I. 1966)).
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the difficulty of getting out to meet the people are unconvincing, to say
the least.75
Nevertheless, the American practice of legislative representation
clearly is dominated by a widely shared, long-standing expectation that
the people of each place will have what amounts to "their own"
representative. It is this emphasis on the representation of citizens
organized as residents of particular places that, in my view, not only
provides the best account of the practice of territorial districting as a
historical matter, but also furnishes its most coherent normative
justification, for a legislature constituted by the representation of people
according to the place in which they live will differ significantly from a
legislature constituted by the representation of citizens grouped
according to other criteria.76 In particular, as I shall explain, territorial
representation can be justified by a certain kind of commitment to
localness and local issues as the proper subject of statewide politics.
If territorial representation is justifiable by any principle stronger
than the administrative need to process the votes of large numbers of
people, the best justification for the practice is certainly that the people
who reside in a particular place, such as a town or a county, comprise a
distinct and coherent community of interest that is entitled to separate
representation in the legislature. Historically, this has in fact been the
dominant justification. Originally, the belief that every local community
was both unique and internally homogeneous arose from the very real
isolation and insularity of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century town
75. "[P]hysical access [of the type promoted by contiguity and compactness
requirements] . . . in today's world of mass media and technology, is not necessary for
communication among the residents of the district or between such residents and their elected
representative." Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 109; see also Jamerson v. Womack, 423 S.E.2d 180,
185-86 (Va. 1992) (rejecting the contention that a lack of district compactness impaired the
ability of a state senator to communicate with constituents). It is, however, somewhat more
plausible to think that communication within a district and between a representative and his
or her constituents might be impaired when the district's lack of compactness becomes so
severe that it spans multiple media markets. See Richard N. Engstrom, District Geography
and Voters, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 30, at 66 (finding that a
district's conformity to the boundaries of local media markets is much more important than
its conformity to local government boundaries in affecting voter turnout within the district).
But see REHFELD, supra note 73, at 174-76 (arguing that "broadcast media" are being
replaced by "direct media," and that in consequence "[c]ommunication to a dispersed group
scattered across the nation is readily becoming as easy ... as buying ads in a local media
market").
76. REHFELD, supra note 73, at 7-8.
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life.77 In the vast, sparsely settled landscape of early America, "[t]he
local community provided within itself a focus for the economic,
political, social, and religious lives of the townspeople. 7 ' Life in
American towns was, in other words, largely self-contained, and there
was consequently "infrequent resort to outside institutions,, 79 including
the state itself.'
As the nineteenth century wore on and advances in transportation
and communication began slowly to break down the starkest forms of
social and cultural isolation, the basis of the belief in local
distinctiveness shifted gradually toward the notion that each local
community was a unique, self-contained economic unit." But whatever
its basis, the idea that localities such as towns and counties are distinct
communities of interest presupposes an organizing set of interests that
are both local (rather than statewide) and unique. Were it otherwise,
the relevant interests entitled to legislative representation would cut
across formal local boundaries, and the proper unit of representation
would be coalitions that are not confined by community lines."
Throughout most of American history, the idea of the socially and
economically independent locality was woven deeply into the structure
of political institutions through the nearly universal practice of
allocating state legislative representatives to fixed units of local
government.83 Until the mid-twentieth century, the most common
practice by far was to assign representatives to counties (towns in New
England), usually in numbers bearing some rough proportion to their
respective populations.' Legislators thus derived their professional
identities, and to a great extent their missions, from the fact that they
77. See, e.g., THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 61-78
(1978); MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 46-48 (1970).
78. BENDER, supra note 77, at 65.
79. Id.
80. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 77, at 29, 37-38, 124, 229.
81. Gardner, supra note 22, at Part III.C.
82. The Supreme Court has often deemed the maintenance of communities of interest
an important consideration in redistricting. E.g., Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581
(1997) (a "low-income population" was properly conceived as a community of interest);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995) (evidence of "fractured ... social, and economic
interests" refuted contention that district contained a community of interest). Just last term,
the Court relied on a lack of genuine community of interest within a redrawn Texas district to
invalidate it under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594
(2006).
83. See, Gardner, supra note 22, at 900.
84. Id. at 900-01.
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had been elected to represent the interests of the residents of a
particular place, interests that had long been understood to be unique
and thus distinct from the interests represented by other legislators
elected from other counties, cities, and towns.
This method of constructing legislative constituencies also has
significant consequences for the kind of politics that is practiced within
the state legislature." A key variable in the construction of democratic
legislatures is the homogeneity of legislative constituencies. When
voters within the various districts are relatively homogeneous, and
therefore have similar political opinions, the representative will
necessarily hold the same views as his or her constituents. In this
situation, representatives have no real occasion to exercise independent
political judgment in the formulation of positions to advance within the
legislature, and their main function will be to act as delegates or agents
of their constituents to promote the univocal interests of their home
districts in legislative deliberation and bargaining. Such a system,
characterized by intradistrict homogeneity and interdistrict
heterogeneity, corresponds closely to the "portrait in miniature" theory
of representation commonplace during the eighteenth century.86 Where,
in contrast, election districts are constructed so as to contain a
heterogeneity of public opinion, the job of representatives is different
and involves the use of greater discretion. Representatives from
heterogeneous districts must initially forge compromises among
coalition partners to win election in the first place, and then exercise
some degree of judgment in legislative deliberation and bargaining to
decide which among the many interests contained in their districts they
will attempt to satisfy on any given occasion.' The belief that localities
such as counties and towns are discrete and homogeneous communities
of interest strongly implicates the former model of representation.
The construction of a system of representation in which legislators
are delegates of homogeneous local communities of interest has
important consequences not only for the way politics is practiced within
85. The following analysis is spelled out in greater detail in Gardner, supra note 22.
86. John Adams, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the
American Colonies, in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 287, 287-89 (C.
Bradley Thompson ed., 2000); The Essex Result, 29 Apr. 1778, in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 112-18. For a discussion of this theory of "descriptive
representation," see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91
(1967).
87. This model corresponds roughly to the median voter theory of contemporary
political science. See Gardner, supra note 22, at 956.
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the legislature, but also for the subject matter of legislative deliberation
and action. Because legislators in this model represent communities
that are constituted fundamentally by their localness-by the residents'
condition of living common and interdependent lives together in a
particular place-the interests that define and constitute the constituent-
legislator relationship, and that legislators may consequently be
expected to represent and advance in the legislature, are necessarily and
correspondingly local. This means that we should expect a state
legislature constructed around principles of territorial representation to
focus its attention primarily on issues of predominantly local concern
rather than on issues of general concern throughout the state. Such a
legislature may therefore be expected to spend most of its time solving
problems that arise in particular localities and resolving conflicting
demands and claims on state resources made by localities.'
In contrast, a legislative system built around the representation of
parties or other ideological groupings would be much more likely to
produce a legislature focused on boundary-crossing issues of statewide
concern. Legislators in such a system would be elected by cross-cutting
coalitions constituted by shared interests that, by definition, are not
local and territorial but statewide and ideological. Such a legislature
would be much more likely to devote most of its attention to issues that
voters throughout the state share in common by virtue of their common
membership in a community that is itself statewide. Where a legislature
designed to represent local, territorial communities of interest might
thus be more likely to take up roads, bridges, and local economic
development projects, a legislature designed to represent parties might
be more likely to concern itself with social welfare programs, crime,
education, and statewide issues of economic prosperity.' Indeed,
territorial representation might well provide a kind of institutional
formula for promoting governmental minimalism, one that is consistent
with eighteenth- and antebellum nineteenth-century conceptions of the
very limited functions that ought to be assigned to any central
88. Some evidence of this phenomenon may be found in the largely successful twentieth
century movement to obtain home rule for localities-that is, to take the state legislature out
of the business of micro-managing the conduct of local affairs. For an overview, see, for
example, U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE LAWS
GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCrURE AND ADMINISTRATION (1993).
89. See, e.g., REHFELD, supra note 73, at 21,152 (arguing that congressional porkbarrel
politics focuses on the local-roads and bridges, community centers and playgrounds-only
and contingently because electoral constituencies are local, thereby furnishing representatives
with incentives to deliver to their constituents benefits in a form that can be enjoyed through
physical proximity rather than in other ways).
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government. Perhaps it is no coincidence that party-based, proportional
systems of representation tend to be found in nations that favor policies
associated with the modern social welfare state.'
My point here is by no means to suggest that legislatures constituted
by the representation of territory are somehow better designed than
those constituted by the representation of party. The opposite might
well be true. It is possible, for example, that the time and effort of a
state legislature is best spent on issues of statewide concern and that
issues of purely local interest are best dealt with at the local level. It is
equally possible that we no longer live in a world in which the residents
of towns and counties have interests that are meaningfully distinct from
the interests of other citizens residing throughout the state, or even
throughout the entire nation, and that the premises on which a system of
territorial representation originally rested have therefore been falsified.
My point, rather, is that it is possible to discern a fair and plausible
justification for territorial districts, sounding in considerations of
institutional design, and resting on a certain set of assumptions about
the nature of American social and economic life, and the desirability of
certain kinds of government activity.
This analysis also reveals that an extremely serious problem with
state legislative representation in the post-Reynolds era has been the
refounding of territorial representation on transient districts whose
boundaries change every decade, if not more frequently. If I am right
that the best available conceptual justification for territorial
representation is that localities comprise distinctive and internally
coherent communities of interest, then it is essential to the institutional
integrity of the representational system that territorial election districts
coincide with actual communities of interest. 9 Yet local communities of
90. According to Powell, systems of pure proportional representation are found in
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland. POWELL, supra note 37, at 28 tbl.2.1.
91. Federal courts seem to recognize this through a jurisprudence of communities of
interest, although the federal conception of community of interest is extremely broad,
encompassing commonalities of socioeconomic status, education, employment, politics,
health, religion, and ethnicity. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997) (a
"low-income population" was properly conceived as a community of interest); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995) (evidence of "fractured... social, and economic interests"
refuted contention that district contained a community of interest); Theriot v. Parish of
Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[L]ess-educated" citizens comprised a
community of interest on the basis of "common social and economic needs" and citizens
"more often unemployed" than voters in other districts comprised a community of interest on
the basis of "common social and economic needs."); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699,
704 (7th Cir. 1998) (Latinos comprise a community of interest); Meza v. Galvin, 322 F. Supp.
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interest do not spring up wherever and whenever a legislature happens
to draw a line; even under the best of circumstances, no community can
long maintain a distinctive identity nor its residents forge and maintain
common bonds and interests unless the community's dimensions, and
thus its population, are comparatively stable. 2 That is undoubtedly why
American states clung for so long to a method of territorial
representation that allocated representatives to fixed units of local
government, units that had in many states existed without change for a
century or more even before the state settled on a representational
system in its initial constitution.93 The present system of territorial
districting thus carries on an old practice, but in a way that makes
impossible the vindication of the practice's actual justification.
IV. FIXED DISTRICTS: AN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOLUTION
TO A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROBLEM?
Our search for a standard of fair partisan representation capable of
operating within a system of territorial districting has led us, it seems, to
a sorry pass. The Supreme Court's apportionment jurisprudence raised
the achievement of interdistrict population equality above a state's
desire to adhere to stable district boundaries of social, political, and
historical significance. States could have solved this problem by
abandoning territorial representation altogether, but evidently found
their commitment to territoriality too strong to let go. Yet the practice
that has emerged seems to offer the worst of all possible worlds.
Adherence to territorial districting has impaired the representation of
political parties, a principle of representation with which territoriality
conflicts. Yet the practice of territorial representation has been so
transformed by the need to comply with federal apportionment
requirements that it is no longer faithful to the principles that justify it in
the first place. We are trying, in other words, to adapt a
2d 52, 57 (D. Mass. 2004) (three-judge court) ("[Tlhe Hispanic community" can comprise "an
ethnically-based community of interest."); Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 512 (E.D.
Tex. 2004) (three-judge court), affd in part, rev'd in part, LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594
(2006) ("evidence of differences in ... health" relevant to existence of a community of
interest); Kelley v. Bennett, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (three-judge court),
vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 28 (2000) ("There are no doubt religious, class, and social
communities of interest that cross county lines and whose protection might be a legitimate
consideration in districting decisions.").
92. See James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political
Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237 (2002).
93. For an account of the evolving political role of New England towns, see
ZUCKERMAN, supra note 77.
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representational system designed for one purpose to achieve other
objectives that it is poorly suited to achieve.
Is there any way out of this trap? Possibly, but only by rethinking
the enterprise. I would put the problem like this. Suppose we take the
American commitment to territorial representation as non-negotiable,
but demand that territorial representation be practiced in a way that is
faithful to its underlying justifications. We may now reformulate the
relevant question: Is there any way to create a system of well-justified
territorial districting that also produces results that are fair to political
parties and still satisfies the requirements of population equality? I
believe there is, and that the model may be found in a practice of
representation that was extremely common in the early nineteenth
century but has since fallen out of favor. In this system, instead of
holding legislative size constant and varying the configuration of
election districts, as we do today, the configuration of election districts
was held constant but the size of the legislature was permitted to vary as
necessary to satisfy requirements of interdistrict population equality. I
shall call this a "fixed district" system of representation.
94
In the most common early-nineteenth-century version of the fixed
district format, election districts coincided with established units of local
government-most often counties, but sometimes towns and cities as
well.9  Each district was then assigned a certain number of
representatives. Although the earliest state constitutions allocated a
fixed and equal number of representatives to each representational unit,
by the 1830s or 1840s, each county's allocation of representatives was
linked to its population.96 Unlike present systems, in which the size of
94. For a similar analysis, see McConnell, supra note 7, at 103, 115 (arguing that
adhering to local government boundaries and varying the number of legislators elected from
the local government unit according to its population would minimize opportunities for
gerrymandering and make district more heterogeneous, limiting political polarization).
95. Counties were the exclusive unit of state legislative representation under DEL.
CONST. art. 3 (1776); N.J. CONST. art. III (1776); VA. CONST. 25 (1776); GA. CONST. arts.
IV, V (1777); N.Y. CONST. art. IV (1777); GA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1789); DEL. CONST. art. II, §
2 (1792); KY. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 6 (1792); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1796); GA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 7 (1798); N.Y. CONST. amend. 11 (1801); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2 (1802); LA. CONST. art. II,
§ 5 (1812); IND. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1816); MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 4 (1820); N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 7 (1821); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1831); N.C. CONST. amend. I, § 2 (1835); ARK.
CONST. art. IV, § 34 (1836); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1838); GA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1843);
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § III (1844). Towns were the unit of representation under VT. CONST. §
XI (1777); MASS. CONST. Part the Second, ch. I, § III, art. 11 (1780); VT. CONST. ch. II, § VII
(1786); VT. CONST. ch. I, § 7 (1793); CONN. CONST. art. 3d, § 3 (1818).
96. Compare DEL. CONST. art. 3 (1776), N.J. CONST. art. III (1776), VA. CONST. 25
(1776), MD. CONST. arts. II, IV, V (1776), N.C. CONST. art. III (1776), PA. CONST. § 17
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the state legislature is typically fixed, the size of the legislature was not
established in advance; the legislature simply consisted of all the
representatives to which each county was entitled, whatever that
number turned out to be.'
A fixed district system of representation has, for present purposes,
three very significant advantages. 98 First, it does justice to the idea of
territorial representation. As discussed above, territorial
representation, if it is to be justified at all, must rest on the fact that the
residents of represented territories comprise distinct and coherent local
communities of interest. This condition can be satisfied, however, only
when the community's dimensions, and thus its population, are
sufficiently stable to allow a genuine community of interest to arise,
forge the relevant ties, and maintain those bonds over time. 9  Using
fixed units of local government as election districts satisfies these
conditions because the represented territory has the permanence
sufficient to allow communal ties to solidify. Moreover, local
governmental units are a good choice for another reason: common
residency in a working, functioning, self-governing locality by itself can
give rise to a political and administrative community of interest entitled
to recognition. As the Colorado Supreme Court recently observed,
"[c]ounties and the cities within their boundaries are already established
as communities of interest in their own right, with a functioning legal
and physical local government identity on behalf of citizens that is
ongoing.'°°  This autogenerative process of community formation
cannot occur in a floating district that has no function other than to elect
a representative; such a district has no real identity even as a merely
administrative community because the district has no function beyond
(1776), and VT. CONST. ch. II, § XVI (1777) (all allocating a constitutionally fixed number of
legislators to represented units), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1796), N.Y. CONST. amend. II
(1801), OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2 (1802), LA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (1812), MISS. CONST. art. III, §
9 (1817), ILL. CONST. art. II, § 5 (1818), TENN. CONST. art. II, § 5 (1834), ARK. CONST. art.
IV, § 34 (1836), PA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1838), TEX. CONST. art. III, § 29 (1845), IOWA CONST.
art. 3, § 31 (1846), and WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1848) (all linking the size of a represented
unit's legislative delegation to its population).
97. Gardner, supra note 22, at 905-06.
98. The following discussion is limited to state legislative districts. States could also
return to a fixed district system of congressional redistricting but only if Congress repeals the
Apportionment Act, which since 1842 (with a few interruptions) has required that members
of Congress be elected from single member districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000). SCHMECKEBIER,
supra note 28, at 132-35.
99. Gardner, supra note 92, at 1238-39.
100. In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1248 (Colo.
2002). For a fuller discussion, see Gardner, supra note 22, at Part III.D.
[90:555
"FAIR" PARTISAN REPRESENTATION
the self-referential one of electing representatives, and its denizens thus
share no human bond or activity other than the duty to perform a single
public act every two or four years.
Second, using counties, cities, and towns as permanent election
districts immediately dissolves any possible objection on the grounds of
unfair partisan representation. This is not because a fixed district
representational system has any necessary tendency to produce
proportional representation of the parties in the state legislature-any
such tendency will be purely coincidental-but because the objection
has no force against a representational system that deliberately resolves
the conflict between partisan and territorial modes of representation in
favor of the representation of territory. In a system of fixed districts,
that is to say, a design choice is made to construct the legislature out of
building blocks consisting of citizens grouped into territorial
communities of local interest rather than into boundary-crossing
communities of ideological, and therefore partisan, interest.
The significance for partisan fairness of the difference between fixed
local government boundaries and the floating boundaries of
contemporary election districts is in fact universally recognized. While
people might routinely complain in some rhetorical sense that Chicago
is "too" Democratic, or that Cobb County, Georgia, is "too"
Republican, nobody ever suggests that the proper remedy for these
imbalances would be to make these jurisdictions "more competitive" by
altering their boundaries. Demands are not heard to require Chicago to
annex politically conservative suburbs to "pick up" more Republicans,
or to extend Cobb County into Atlanta to "pick up" more Democrats.
We simply do not draw city or county lines for the purpose of making
city and county elections competitive; such jurisdictions are understood
to have political identities distinct from and far more important than the
mere partisan affiliation of the residents who happen to inhabit them at
any given moment. Consequently, cities, towns, and counties are
understood simply to have the partisan profiles that they happen to have
acquired, and changing a jurisdiction's profile would never count as a
legitimate reason to alter its boundaries."'
101. During the nineteenth century, legislatures did occasionally gerrymander by
creating new towns and counties. Gardner, supra note 22, at 903-04. State constitutional
prohibitions soon arose to limit such practices, including banning the creation of new counties
with suspiciously low populations, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1821); MICH. CONST. art. IV, §
4 (1835); ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 29 (1836); LA. CONST. tit. II, art. 8 (1845), and making the
express approval of a county's residents a condition for dividing the county or altering its
2007]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless, although it is in no way a goal of a fixed-district
representational system to enhance partisan fairness, there is, ironically,
good reason to believe that such a system would in fact increase the
ability of parties to compete fairly for control of districts. As indicated
earlier, contemporary theories of democracy claim that parties should,
in principle, be able to compete successfully for any office by modifying
their positions to appeal to the relevant electorate. However, where the
identity of the electorate changes every ten years, sometimes
dramatically, parties may well find it impossible in many districts to
undertake the retooling necessary to compete. When the election is
from a district that never changes, however, parties may well be able to
take a longer view and invest in gradually making the alterations
necessary to mount a successful appeal to the district's voters. Consider,
for example, that in Massachusetts and New York, two bastions of
statewide Democratic strength, Republicans have occupied the
governor's chair since 1990 and 1994, respectively. New York City, an
even more overwhelmingly Democratic jurisdiction, has elected
Republican mayors since 1994. While many factors doubtless account
for these results, one of them, surely, is the permanence of the
"districts" that elect chief executives and other jurisdiction-wide
officials,"2 a stability that has permitted Republicans to stake out
electorally successful positions.
Finally, a fixed district representational system satisfies the federal
constitutional requirement of one-person, one-vote because each county
or town can be allocated a number of representatives proportional to its
population. This distinguishes the fixed district systems of the early
nineteenth century from those of the early twentieth century, which
were invalidated by the Supreme Court in its reapportionment rulings.
By the early twentieth century, most states had moved to legislatures of
mandatory fixed size.' °3 This meant that a fixed number of legislators
had somehow to be parceled out among the counties, leading inevitably
to population disparities even if a state regularly and diligently
boundaries, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. II, § 30 (1851); MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1908); OKLA.
CONST. art. XVII, § 4 (1907).
102. Evidence from Japan suggests that the use of fixed districts by itself so constrains
partisan gerrymandering that such districts display very little partisan bias. Ray Christensen,
Redistricting in Japan: Lessons for the United States, 5 JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. 259 (2004).
Whether this result is an artifact of demographics peculiar to Japan is less clear, although the
author believes similar results would be obtained in at least some parts of the U.S. Id. at 281-
84.
103. Gardner, supra note 22, at 911.
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attempted to equalize interdistrict populations. The problem, in other
words, was not created by the use of fixed districts, but by the use of
fixed districts combined with a legislature of fixed size. The kind of
fixed district system discussed here does not share this infirmity because
the size of the legislature is free to float as needed to maintain
proportionate representation of districts.
There are, however, two potential disadvantages of a fixed district
system. First, maintenance of strict population proportionality in the
size of district legislative delegations can in certain circumstances cause
the legislature to grow very large, perhaps to the point of
unwieldiness. °" For example, if a state with a population of five million
uses counties as fixed election districts, but its smallest county has a
population of only five thousand, it will need a legislature of one
thousand representatives to maintain population equality. In the
nineteenth century, a commonplace solution to this problem was to
create the occasional multicounty district, either by combining small
counties into a single district, 5 or by assigning small counties to a larger
neighboring county for purposes of representation.' °6 Although this
practice is less than ideal if the assumption motivating territoriality is
that each county comprises a distinct community of interest, so long as
any multicounty districts so formed are fixed and permanent, the
compromise is not wholly inconsistent with the premises of territorial
districting.
104. This is probably what caused states to impose caps on legislative size in the first
place. For example, according to the record of the 1876 New Hampshire constitutional
convention, the single most important purpose of the convention was to reduce the size of the
house, which, under the state constitution's system of representation by town, had become
very large. See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE passim (1877).
105. This was extremely common, and was often accomplished by an initial
constitutional specification of representative districts, typically subject to legislative change
based on new population data. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. ord. § V (1834); N.C. CONST. amend.
I, § 2 (1835); N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 4 (1846); OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 7 (1851); MISS.
CONST. art. XI, § 2 (1868) (all creating multi-county senatorial districts).
106. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1819) (towns too small to be entitled to their own
representative to be "classed," or grouped together to form districts of sufficient population);
MASS. CONST. art. XII (1836) (towns too small to be entitled to their own representative may
voluntarily group themselves together for purposes of electing representatives); LA. CONST.
tit. II, art. 15 (1845) (new parishes to be attached for purposes of senatorial representation to
parish from which they were created); CONN. CONST. art. XVIII (1876) (new towns too small
to be entitled to their own representative to be joined for purposes of representation to town
from which their territory was taken). The New England provisions authorizing "classing" of
small towns do not appear to impose any contiguity requirement on districts formed in this
way.
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The second potential problem with fixed districts is that the number
of representatives allocated to a very populous county or other local
government unit may be large, and at some point the sheer amount of
information voters must process may exceed the capacity and interest
even of well-informed and highly motivated voters. It is one thing to ask
voters to select, say, four or five representatives, and quite another to
expect them to make an intelligent choice of fifteen or twenty. In these
cases, the best course may be to subdivide the county, city, or town into
districts. In the nineteenth century, such partition was often permitted,
but the blow to principles of territorial representation was typically
softened by requiring the larger jurisdiction to be carved into
subdivisions that were themselves constructed out of permanently fixed,
but smaller, jurisdictions. Thus, a county might be divided into districts
comprised of one or more whole towns, or a large city might be divided
into districts comprised of whole wards. "n
This strategy unquestionably strains the assumptions that justify
territorial districting. If counties are by hypothesis discrete and
internally coherent communities of interest, there is no particular reason
to suppose that several adjacent towns within a county might themselves
form an equivalently coherent and organic community of interest. On
the other hand, very large counties and cities by their sheer size alone
equally call into question the assumptions behind territorial districting:
it is far from clear that a jurisdiction containing a million or more people
can really be deemed a single community of local interest, much less an
internally coherent one. Where plans of institutional design must
simultaneously satisfy numerous potentially conflicting goals, however,
it seems overly fussy to demand that no compromise impugn any design
assumption.
The subject of fussiness brings me back to the Supreme Court. The
one-person, one-vote doctrine is surely one of the Court's fussiest, for
the Court has required that states justify any deviation from exact
population equality among districts greater than about ten percent, 8
and the Court has rarely found state interests sufficient to justify much
107. E.g., CONN. CONST. amend. 11 (1828) (subdivisions of multi-senator counties to be
comprised of whole towns); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1846) (subdivisions of
multi-representative counties to be comprised of whole towns ); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 3
(1850) (subdivisions of multi-representative counties to be comprised of whole towns and
cities); PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1873) (subdivisions of multi-senator counties to be comprised
of whole wards, boroughs, and townships).
108. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
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more of a deviation.'" This has struck many observers as misguidedly
formalistic."' I certainly have reason to feel aggrieved when your vote is
worth more than mine by fifteen or twenty orders of magnitudes, but it
is less clear that the Constitution ought to be concerned when your
advantage is in the vicinity of fifteen or twenty percent. In any event,
the more rigid the standard of population equality, the more readily
fixed districting leads to the twin problems of overly large legislatures
and overly large legislative delegations. On the other hand, population
deviations larger than ten percent are not prohibited; they merely must
be supported by some rational justification."' I would hope that the
justification for fixed districts I have laid out here would count as the
kind of reason that federal courts might find capable of justifying
deviations from strict population equality, and that they would therefore
permit states using fixed districts a bit more latitude to avoid
compromising the system's underlying justifications."' There can be no
state interest, it seems to me, more compelling than the interest in
constructing a political system satisfactory to the state's citizens, and if
the people of a state prefer a state politics that is oriented toward the
solution of local problems, I can think of nothing in the U.S.
Constitution that could properly be understood to deny them that
choice. "'
109. One of the few exceptions is Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 329 (1973), in
which the Court upheld a districting plan containing a maximum deviation of 16% from strict
equality, although the average district deviation in that plan was a mere 3.89%. In Brown v.
Thomson, 462 U.S. at 846, the Court went as far as it has ever gone by upholding a plan
containing an average deviation of 16% and a maximum deviation of 89%. This was justified,
the Court held, by the state's desire to give each county at least one representative.
110. See, e.g., ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 21-22 (1968); Sanford Levinson, One Person,
One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002); McConnell, supra note
7, at 107-09.
111. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 325,328; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
112. There is reason to be optimistic that this would be the case. In Brown v. Thomson,
462 U.S. 835, the Court upheld Wyoming's system of county representation against a one-
person, one-vote challenge where it resulted in one very small county receiving the state
constitutionally mandated minimum of one representative even where that allocation created
a deviation from strict population equality of eighty-nine percent: "There ... can be no
question that Wyoming's constitutional policy.., of using counties as representative districts
and ensuring that each county has one representative is supported by substantial and
legitimate state concerns." Id. at 843.
113. On the other hand, the Court has shown little sensitivity or deference to state
choices regarding the structure and operation of state democratic institutions. Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000), is certainly the prime example, but Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), in which the Court afforded no deference to a state decision to
establish a system of nonpartisan judicial elections, is another. On the Court's lack of
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Finally, there is little reason to fear that a system of fixed districts
would run afoul of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits
the use of voting practices and procedures that result in an abridgement
of the right to vote on account of race. "4 First, it is by no means clear
that Section 2 would even apply to a state's choice to adopt a
representation system of fixed districts where those districts coincide
with established local governments. Despite its broad language, Section
2 has not been construed to reach each and every state decision on how
to structure its electoral system; instead, federal courts have tended to
view some of the most basic decisions about the structure of governance
as antecedent to, and thus outside the scope of, any application of
Section 2. Such decisions include state and municipal choices
concerning the basic form of representation and those locating the
boundaries of local governments." It thus seems unlikely that Section 2
would be construed to prohibit a state from basing its system of
legislative representation directly on local government units. Second,
deference in this area, see James A. Gardner, Forcing States to Be Free: The Emerging
Constitutional Guarantee of Radical Democracy, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1467 (2003).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) ("No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color .. "). The fear would be that minority
populations are distributed among counties or their subdivisions in a way that would unduly
diminish their representation in the legislature. The seminal case is Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986), in which the Court required an at-large system of representation to be broken
up into single-member districts.
115. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (rejecting a Section 2 challenge to a county's
use of a single-commissioner form of government where use of a five-member commission
would allow blacks a voice in governance decisions, on the ground that black voting power
under an alternative form of governance did not furnish a proper point of comparison); City
of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (city's decision to annex outlying,
overwhelmingly white areas was not subject to Section 2 on the ground that black voting
power before and after the annexation could not be compared because the city, following the
annexation, was a different entity). As the Eleventh Circuit explained, Section 2 implies "a
limitation on the ability of a federal court to abolish a particular form of government and to
use its imagination to fashion a new system. Nothing in the Voting Rights Act suggests an
intent on the part of Congress to permit the federal judiciary to force on the states a new
model of government .... " Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994); see also
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999) (court refused to order a
city to change its boundaries by annexing territory to alter the racial balance of the city's
population); African-American Citizens for Change v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 24
F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 1994) (Section 2 inapplicable to municipality's decision to make certain
offices appointive rather than elective). For a critique of this approach to Section 2, see
Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act,
77 VA. L. REV. 1 (1991). Of course, any decision, including the choice of government
structures and local boundaries, may run afoul of the Constitution if it is made purposefully to
discriminate against racial minorities. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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even if Section 2 did apply to the use of fixed districts, any violation
could easily be avoided by using multimember districts for the more
populous jurisdictions, so long as the voting system avoided features
that have the effect of suppressing the ability of minorities to elect
representatives of their choice."6
V. CONCLUSIONS: FIXED DISTRICTS AND THE WISCONSIN
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
Given the focus of this conference, I want to conclude by considering
very briefly the relation between the system of fixed districts I have
described and a fairly unusual feature of Wisconsin constitutional
jurisprudence. In the great majority of states, for the great majority of
their constitutional history, interdistrict population equality was viewed
as a goal subordinate to the representation of permanent units of local
government. Until the Supreme Court put a stop to the practice, most
states were well willing to tolerate population deviations that were
extreme by modern standards so as to preserve the separate
representation of individual localities, and indeed many states wrote
into their constitutions rules for allocating representatives that all but
guaranteed sometimes gross disparities in the number of people
represented by legislators elected from the various counties, cities, and
towns. 117
Wisconsin, apparently alone among the states, has a constitutional
tradition that might be said to differ from the norm. Like the
constitutions of many other states, the Wisconsin Constitution has long
contained provisions providing both for the allocation of representatives
by district population ("according to the number of inhabitants")11 8 and
for the separate representation of local government units, a requirement
implemented by a prohibition on drawing assembly districts that divide
counties, towns, precincts, or wards."9 However, in a series of rulings
stretching back more than a century, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
116. For example, one such device is a place system, in which candidates compete head-
to-head for designated seats. For a description, see White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
117. These included caps on the number of representatives a district could elect, see, e.g.,
VT. CONST. ch. II, § VII (1786) (no more than two representatives per town); GA. CONST. art.
I, § 7 (1798) (no more than four representatives per county); CONN. CONST. art. XV (1874)
(no more than two representatives per town), and requiring increasing increments of
population for a jurisdiction to earn additional representatives, see, e.g., MD. CONST. art. III,
§ 4 (1864); MO. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1875); N.H. CONST. pt. II, § 9 (1877).
118. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
119. Id. art. IV, § 4.
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interpreted these potentially conflicting provisions to make the
achievement of population equality the paramount goal of the
apportionment process. ' 2°  As recently as 1964, the court ruled
categorically that the primary aim of the constitutional apportionment
scheme is "per capita equality of representation," and that the
constitutional provision barring the crossing of local boundaries is not to
be understood to contain any "consciously built-in standard of
apportionment that reflects area or any other geographical factor.''
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in other words, seems to have construed
Wisconsin's system of representation to be designed primarily to
represent equipopulous groups of individuals rather than residents of
particular fixed places.
If Wisconsin in fact has a tradition of non-territorial representation
in the state legislature, a resort to fixed districts consisting of permanent
local government units may not be the best approach. Indeed, in these
circumstances one might well ask why Wisconsin, with a system of
representation more suitable to the representation of statewide parties
than communities of local interest, should not fully implement its own
deeply held commitments at a stroke by adopting a system of
proportional representation? If the answer, however, is that such a
method would likely prove unpopular, then perhaps the
representational tradition purportedly identified by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court is not as deeply rooted as that court's assertions would
suggest. Perhaps the people of Wisconsin, like Americans elsewhere,
really do expect that they will be represented in the state legislature,
along with their neighbors, as residents of a particular place who share a
locally constituted community of interest. In that case, constitutional
reform in the direction of fixed districts, though it might represent a
larger change for Wisconsin than for other states, might be worth
considering.
120. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892); State ex
rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892).
121. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 556, 126 N.W.2d 551, 558
(1964); see also id. at 566, 126 N.W.2d at 563 ("This requirement does not build a competing
geographical or autonomy of local unit standard of apportionment into the constitution.").
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